Let's Make a Deal

What the language of deals and deal-making reveals about our politics

Monty Hall (1921-2017), host of the Let’s Make a Deal game show.

 “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
 “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
 “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that's all.” —Through the Looking Glass, by Lewis Carroll

“Deal” may be the most overused and elusive word of our time. There are near-constant accounts of deals, or potential deals, between Russia and Ukraine, between India and Pakistan, among various Middle East parties, and between the United States and other nations about trade and tariffs. Other stories describe deals to house or imprison deportees from the United States, and deals driven by Executive Orders directed at major American law firms and universities.

The closing of a deal has traditionally meant that parties negotiating in good faith completed a transaction with an outcome that, while not perfect for any party, contained benefits such that the undertakings or constraints involved are worth paying a price for and/or acting according to the terms set out in an agreement. In a sign of the times, the word “deal” is now used in very different contexts.

President Trump rose to prominence partly through his best-selling book, The Art of the Deal. Closely examined, the Administration’s incessant language about deals is really the language of promotion. A promoter holds out the promise of a deal, which can be illusory to potential investors or in the realm of politics, to voters.

As a lawyer in private practice, I worked with clients and others who were consumed with deals and how to make them. The Administration’s descriptions of its actual or promised trade, foreign policy, economic, and culture war deals bring back memories of the ways I saw those seeking deals delude themselves and others.

With the proliferation of supposed deal-making and deal-related thinking today, it is timely to explore what is, and is not, a deal, what it takes to make a deal that means anything, and the language of deal-making.

The Importance of Promising a “Great Deal”

The examples of the Administration promising that something will be a “great deal” for someone (America, Ukraine, etc.) are numerous. A primary characteristic of a promoter, as opposed to a serious participant in public policy, is the promise of a “great deal,” irrespective of what actually transpires.

Here is a paragraph from a May 10 story in The New York Times on the U.S.-China trade talks:

On Friday, Mr. Trump signaled that he was prepared to begin lowering tariffs, suggesting that an 80 percent rate on Chinese imports seemed appropriate. Later in the day, referring to the China trade talks, Mr. Trump said, “We have to make a great deal for America.” He added that he would not be disappointed if a deal was not reached right away, arguing that not doing business is also a good deal for the United States.

This is the language of a promoter. The message distills to, “Believe me about this great deal and you win regardless of whether the deal occurs or not.”

What Does it Take to Make a Deal?

The corruption of “deal” is evident in the way President Trump described his trade policy on May 6:

I could announce 50 to 100 deals right now because you know, I’m the shopkeeper and I keep the store…And I can just set those terms and they can go shopping or they don’t have to go shopping, because everybody wants to shop here.

Conflating storekeeping, or merchandising and price setting, with completing international trade agreements elides what it means to reach a trade compact with another country. Exercising pricing power, or making demands on counter parties, is not the same as completing a carefully negotiated and durable trade agreement which can take months or years. The language is driven by the Administration’s sweaty focus on announcing deals, regardless of substance.

In a paradox, deals matter until they don’t. On May 6, The New York Times reported on President Trump’s meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney this way:

“Everyone says ‘When, when, when are you going to sign deals?’” Mr. Trump said, at one point motioning toward Howard Lutnick, the commerce secretary. “We don’t have to sign deals. We could sign 25 deals right now, Howard, if we wanted to. We don’t have to sign deals. They have to sign deals with us. They want our market. We don’t want a piece of their market. We don’t care about their market.”

The Times story, which is almost totally about deals (“One day we’ll come and we’ll give you 100 deals,” the president said.) can be seen

When a Deal is Not a Functioning Agreement

The Executive Orders directed at major American law firms are an existential threat to their businesses. Nine firms elected to “bend the knee” and enter into agreements with the Administration that included, among other things, commitments by the firms to perform a total of $940 million of pro bono legal work.

There are strong indications that the agreements between the Administration and the law firms do not represent a true meeting of the minds of the parties.

An April 22 column in The Washington Post titled “Trump’s ‘deal’ with law firms: Who’s bamboozling whom?” by lawyer David Kendall of Williams & Connolly identified significant gaps in the agreements between the Administration and the law firms. The column is viewable

Kendall observed:

The deals do not appear to have been formalized in bilateral documents, signed by the parties and specifying respective duties, obligations and penalties for noncompliance. Though some of the firms have issued internal documents (which have quickly made their way to the media), none of these appear to have been approved by the Trump administration.

In addition, the two sides’ accounts of the agreements often seem asymmetrical. Trump, for example, in an executive order revoking the original executive order regarding Paul Weiss, claimed the firm “will engage in a remarkable change of course” and “specifically … has acknowledged the wrongdoing of its former partner Mark Pomerantz.” (Pomerantz left Paul Weiss in 2021 to work on a criminal investigation of Trump.) The firm made no such acknowledgment in public.

The Perkins Coie firm was the subject of an Executive Order titled “Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP” which is viewable

Perkins Coie did not go the deal route; the firm hired Williams & Connolly to litigate the validity of the Executive Order issued against it.

Sometimes the best deal is one that is not made. On May 2, 2025, Judge Beryl A. Howell of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a lacerating 102-page opinion invalidating the Executive Order issued against Perkins Coie. Judge Howell’s opinion can be read

Deals are Much Easier to Talk About Than to Make

The double-sided truism about deal-making, “You can make any deal if you want to make it bad enough” seems evident in the Administration’s position relating to a trade agreement with China which was the subject of bilateral talks in Geneva earlier this month.

On May 11, ABC News reported that the White House announced that the White House announced that it “reached a deal [with China] without providing any details.” The differences in how the representatives of the United States and China described what happened in Geneva are revealing:

While U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer called it a “deal,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who was in Switzerland for the talks with Greer, said only that "substantial progress" had been made.

“The two sides agreed on establishing a consultation mechanism for trade and economic issues, identify the lead persons on each side, and will carry on further consultations relating to trade and economic issues of their respective concerns,” the Chinese vice premier said.

So, depending on who is worthy of belief, the outcome of the U.S.-China discussions in Switzerland was (i) a deal, (ii) substantial progress, or (iii) an agreement on “a consultation mechanism for trade and economic issues” with further consultations to come.

The White House’s desperation for something it can call a deal comes through very clearly. In contrast, China’s Vice Premier used the cautious and incremental language of diplomacy. Not surprisingly, the tariff agreement between the United States and China expires in 90 days.

The ABC News story can be viewed

One of the persistent flaws in the Administration’s deal-driven approach to almost every issue is the failure to recognize that a meaningful agreement requires a willing counterparty. This explains President Trump’s descriptions or musings about China and who called, or should call, or will call, whom.

The Unintended Consequences of a Hasty Deal

The future may involve institutions and the Administration reckoning with the consequences of making a rushed deal that is incomplete, ambiguous, silent as to essential terms, or otherwise flawed. Surely, Columbia University’s leaders are reassessing the university’s deal with the Administration in light of Harvard University’s decision to litigate a similar set of issues.

The nine law firms that agreed to provide $940 million in pro bono legal services may have assumed that this commitment would apply to their existing pro bono clients, or to new clients with similar legal issues. That assumption may not be correct. An April 25, 2025, Executive Order titled “Strengthening and Unleashing America’s Law Enforcement to Pursue Criminals and Protect Innocent Citizens” shows that the Administration has a different understanding. The Executive Order can be viewed

Section 2 of the Executive Order states:

The Attorney General shall take all appropriate action to create a mechanism to provide legal resources and indemnification to law enforcement officers who unjustly incur expenses and liabilities for actions taken during the performance of their official duties to enforce the law. This mechanism shall include the use of private-sector pro bono assistance for such law enforcement officers.

When the nine law firms signed up to provide pro bono legal services, the defense of police misconduct cases may not have been on their radar as a pro bono initiative. In contrast, the Executive Order authorizes the Attorney General to direct the firms to undertake $940 million worth of that work on an unpaid basis. The disconnect is stark and its resolution, or lack thereof, will be interesting.

Other Themes and Final Thoughts

The examples of deal-related rhetoric described here are not all-inclusive. For example, another recurring deal-related construct is, “Our-deals-are-vastly-superior-to-those-made-by-the-stupid-prior-Administration.” You may have your own favorite examples of this theme.

The exaltation of deals and deal-making in so many contexts reveals an Administration that, thus far, has promoted many more deals than it has completed. Deal posturing and rhetoric is ultimately self-limiting—it sells the promise of progress when little or none occurs.

Issuing 147 Executive Orders and promoting deals are exercises in ruling. The real work of governing is much harder. Wariness about the promise and language of deals is appropriate, particularly when so many of the Administration’s purported deals are flawed or illusory.

Your comments are very welcome.

Special thanks to Chuck Finke and Rod Fonda for assistance with this post.

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